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The Meming of Substantive Due Process 
Jamal Greene† 
 
Substantive due process is notoriously regarded as a textual 
contradiction, but it is in fact redundant. The word “due” cannot be 
honored except by inquiring into the relationship between the nature 
and scope of the deprived interest and the process—whether 
judicial, administrative, or legislative—that attended the 
deprivation. The treatment of substantive due process as an 
oxymoron is what this Essay calls a constitutional meme, an idea 
that replicates through imitation within the constitutional culture 
rather than (necessarily) through logical persuasion. We might even 
call the idea a “precedent,” in the nature of other legal propositions 
within a common law system. This Essay explores the intellectual 
and social history of the substantive-due-process-as-contradiction 
meme and argues that it is often appropriate for judges to rely upon 
such memes even if their underlying claims lack analytic integrity. 
Judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases is best understood 
as an act of translation between the decisional process of the judge 
and the representations necessary to validate the decision within the 
constitutional culture. 
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Introduction 
Substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms.1 Indeed, it is 
redundant. No inquiry into the propriety of some process—its “due”-ness—is or 
can be indifferent to the substance of the associated loss. Due process contemplates 
a rule of reason that calibrates the relation between, on one hand, the nature and 
scope of a deprivation and, on the other, the process that attends it.2 For some 
deprivations, a simple majority vote in the legislature and the signature of the 
executive is sufficient process; for others, more, even a constitutional amendment, 
may be required. It would beg the question to pronounce, tout court, that any 
particular legislative process is always constitutionally adequate. It would turn the 
word “due” into surplus.3 
It has somehow become common ground across the ideological spectrum 
that a textual analysis of this sort fails.4 These days, the most damning charge 
against substantive due process is not that it gets the history wrong or that it unduly 
empowers judges, both of which might be accurate, but rather that it abuses the 
English language, which is not. Part of this Essay’s project, then, is to shift the 
terrain on which the battle over the Due Process Clause is waged. Standing alone, 
the constitutional text supports substantive due process because the word 
substantive, to repeat, is redundant. Part I makes this case. It argues that neither 
“substantive” nor “procedural” due process holds superior title to the phrase “due 
                                                 
1 Cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980). 
2 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–63 
(1970). 
3 See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 35 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 330 (2012) (“A procedure‐only approach to due process cannot 
account for the meaning of the word ‘due.’”). 
4 See id. at 284 (“[F]or decades it has been a commonplace of law schools that substantive due 
process is an oxymoron . . . .”). In addition to Ely, see, e.g., Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 
(7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process “the ubiquitous oxymoron”); McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring the judgment) 
(“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only “process” before a person is 
deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for 
even the most casual user of words.”); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 91 
(1997) (“Now when you say those words ‘substantive due process’ over and over, you must see . . . 
that the phrase is incorrigibly self-contradictory.”); Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: 
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1071 (1984) (referring to “the awful oxymoron 
of substantive due process”); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517, 1531 (2008) (“For me as an originalist, the very notion of 
substantive due process is an oxymoron.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution 
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 897 (2009) (calling 
substantive due process a “made-up, atextual invention”). 
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process of law” or, at the least, that staring at the Constitution contributes nothing 
to the argument.5 
It would be valuable enough to stop there. For as central as the Due Process 
Clause has been to constitutional law over the last century, the inconsistency of 
Griswold v. Connecticut6 and its progeny with the constitutional text is no longer 
contested.7 As time has passed, the weight of stare decisis has crowded out any 
affirmative textual argument in favor of “substantive” due process. The Court itself 
said three decades ago in a unanimous opinion that substantive due process is not 
suggested by the Constitution’s language and indeed “is nothing more than the 
accumulated product of judicial interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”8 This concession tends to stunt the growth of the doctrine and places 
supporters of particular constitutional rights—especially to sexual and reproductive 
autonomy—unnecessarily on the defensive. It also poses a dilemma for teachers of 
constitutional law, who must indoctrinate into students a textual difference between 
“substantive” and “procedural” due process that disappears on reflection. 
As Part II explains, it was not always thus. Substantive due process was a 
phrase seldom used in constitutional law until at least the 1960s, and its prominence 
rose dramatically in the 1980s when legal conservatives (and some liberals) began 
to lampoon it as a textual anomaly. It was not, as some would have it, a careless 
Warren Court innovation, repurposed from the Gilded Age and exposed for its 
absurdity after the rise of textualism. In fact, from the dawn of the Fourteenth 
Amendment up until the Warren Court, invocations of due process were frequently 
what we would now call “substantive” due process, and attacks on the doctrine were 
not usually based on the Constitution’s text, which is too vague to contradict much 
of anything. The term substantive due process was part of the rhetorical process 
that made Lochner v. New York an anticanonical precedent, one that is repeatedly 
and (nearly) universally cited as an example of badly misguided constitutional 
decisionmaking.9 Lochner’s anticanonicity came about in the 1970s and flourished 
in the 1980s as part of the case against sexual privacy and abortion rights. 
                                                 
5 Debates over the conceptual difference between substance and process in the context of due 
process of law are of long standing. For a flavor of the various positions, see, e.g., Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85. Whether or not there is a 
conceptual difference, I do believe there is a practical difference, as noted below. See Part I infra. 
6 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
7 This is true of both the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendment Clauses. As this Essay focuses on the 
text rather than the history of the provisions, I use the clauses interchangeably unless noted. For 
discussion of potential differences between the two clauses, see Ryan C. Williams, The One and 
Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010). 
8 Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1985) (quoting Moore v. City of 
E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 543–44 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)). 
9 See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
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Substantive due process was a phrase largely created by its enemies and attributed 
to its supporters in a strategic assault on particular Court decisions. 
Part III sorts out the implications of this story for the role of analytic 
integrity in the formation of constitutional arguments. Whether or not substantive 
due process is logically a contradiction in terms, its status as an oxymoron has 
become what I call a constitutional meme. A meme is a cultural element—a word, 
an idea, a set of assumptions—whose growth and evolution are sometimes said to 
mimic genetic transmission.10 A constitutional meme is one passed among and 
through generations of lawyers, scholars, and judges as the conventional wisdom 
of constitutional law. The wrongness of Lochner, the unamendability of the 
Constitution via Article V, the tiers of scrutiny framework, and the textual absurdity 
of substantive due process each exemplifies a constitutional meme. Each is an idea, 
a cluster of information, so deeply embedded that it is often stated without further 
proof or elaboration and resists counterargument.11 
Constitutional memes are vital to constitutional law. We can understand 
constitutional law as a set of resources for making constitutional arguments. Those 
resources fall within a limited number of domains—the text, historical materials, 
precedents, prudential arguments, and so forth. Close cases arise when advocates 
for divergent positions both have substantial resources to draw upon within these 
domains. Constitutional doctrine does not depend on which set of resources 
provides correct answers in some metaphysical sense; it depends on who 
successfully persuades judges and other legal officials who enjoy decisionmaking 
authority. Invoking constitutional memes can help to persuade decisionmakers by 
narrowing the ground of argument in ways that are favorable to one’s position.  
                                                 
10 See generally RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).  
11 Each of the examples noted in the text is notionally vulnerable to counterargument. Lochner is 
consistent with a culture of rights, a concern for minority political representation, and (arguably) the 
original understanding of the Due Process Clause. See Greene, supra note 9, at 417–22; see 
generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER (2012). The U.S. Constitution is 
infrequently amended in comparison to many in the world, see ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG, 
& JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009), but it is far from obvious 
whether this textual stability is structurally determined or is instead a dynamic feature of the 
prevailing constitutional culture. See Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional 
Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment 
Difficulty (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 682, 2014); see also 
JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 69–
72 (2013) (arguing that the Article V amendment process has not been too strict to prevent 
substantial political change). The descriptive imprecision of the tiers of scrutiny framework is well-
known, see, e.g., James E. Fleming, “There Is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation 
of Justice Stevens’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301 (2006), even as 
departures from the framework continue to form the basis for criticism of the Court’s work. See 
Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 67 STAN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2015). 
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Judges operate subject to ethical obligations extending beyond the need to 
persuade decisionmakers, and that may temper their resort to memes that are 
rhetorically useful but false. But the epistemological structure of constitutional law 
does not permit constitutional judges to ignore altogether the demands of 
persuasion. They must, in effect, translate their decisions into a language 
susceptible to validation by the public that constitutional law ultimately serves. The 
act of translation can place a judge in the uncomfortable but unavoidable space 
between legal fictions and lies.12 
 
I 
Substantive due process is often defined but rarely with precision. John Hart 
Ely’s quip that substantive due process is a contradiction in terms—“sort of like 
‘green pastel redness’”13—is as famous as anything ever said in a constitutional law  
monograph, but the ubiquity of the quip should raise suspicion as to its analytic 
clarity.14 Ely describes his target as the view that the Due Process Clause 
“incorporat[es] a general mandate to review the substantive merits of legislative 
and other governmental action.”15 Justice Scalia, the most prominent modern critic 
of the doctrine, writes: 
By its inescapable terms, [the Due Process Clause] guarantees only process. 
Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken; even life can be 
taken; but not without the process that our traditions require—notably, a 
                                                 
12 Cf. JEREMY BENTHAM, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTIONS 141 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1932) (“What you 
have been doing by fiction—could you, or could you not have done it without the fiction? If not, 
your fiction is a wicked lie: if yes, a foolish one. Such is the dilemma. Lawyer! Escape from it if 
you can.”). 
13 ELY, supra note 1, at 18. 
14 Universal or near-universal assent is sometimes said to be a measure of truth. See John Finnis, 
Natural Law and the Ethics of Discourse, 43 Am. J. JURIS. 53, 54 (1998) (describing the Platonic 
viewpoint). Often this claim assumes not only some form of rational deliberation and reflective 
judgment on the part of participants but it also may assume that individuals are more likely than not 
to be right. See Hélène Landemore, Collective Wisdom: Old and New, in COLLECTIVE WISDOM: 
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 2 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012). Cf. JAMES 
SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THE FEW AND HOW 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, AND NATIONS (2004)).  
Unanimity may reflect a lack of textured analysis or incomplete theorization. See Cass R. Sunstein, 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995). The Talmudic puzzle that 
unanimity on the Sanhedrin led to acquittal seems to adopt some version of this reasoning—a 
unanimous verdict suggests a troubling lack of independent judgment. See Emphraim Glatt, The 
Unanimous Verdict According to the Talmud: Ancient Law Providing Insight Into Modern Legal 
Theory, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE 316, 324–25 (2013). 
15 Id. at 15. 
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validly enacted law and a fair trial. To say otherwise is to abandon 
textualism, and to render democratically adopted texts mere springboards 
for judicial lawmaking.16 
In the same vein, Robert Bork insists that the Due Process Clause “is simply a 
requirement that the substance of any law be applied to a person through fair 
procedures by any tribunal hearing a case [and] says nothing whatever about what 
the substance of the law must be.”17 Laurence Tribe writes that the text of the 
provision “suggests a guarantee that, whatever the substance of the rules of conduct 
government promulgates, those rules may not be brought to bear on any person so 
as to deprive that person of life, liberty, or property without fair procedures—such 
as a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.”18 Richard Posner has called 
substantive due process a “durable oxymoron” whereunder “persons harmed by 
state regulation [may] complain that the regulation is so unreasonable a deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property that it is unconstitutional even if adopted and applied in 
conformity with the most rigorous procedural safeguards.”19 
An example may help to diagnose the inadequacy of these formulations as 
criticisms of substantive due process. The Court’s recent, controversial expansion 
of the Due Process Clause to condemn prohibitions on same-sex marriage supplies 
a ready hypothetical. Let us turn back the clock to the day before the Court’s 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.20 Suppose a county registrar refuses to issue a 
marriage license solely on the ground that the two people who wish to marry are 
both men. In this particular state, the state constitution defines marriage as the union 
of a man and a woman. The couple sues, arguing that an agent of the state has 
deprived them of liberty without due process of law in violation of the federal 
Constitution. According to Ely, Scalia, Bork, Tribe, and Posner—an august, 
eclectic bunch—this claim does violence to the text (a charge that would bother 
some more than others).  
But why? Getting married is a liberty, indeed one previously recognized as 
fundamental by the Supreme Court,21 and denial of a marriage license constitutes a 
deprivation of that liberty. The denial was effected by a process of law, namely a 
                                                 
16ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24–25 (1997). 
17 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 31 (1990). 
18 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1332-33 (3d ed. 2000). 
19 Illinois Psych. Assoc. v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987); accord Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 
F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (calling substantive due process “the ubiquitous oxymoron”). 
20 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
21 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978). But see 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at ____ (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Due Process Clause does 
not protect positive liberties). 
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state constitutional amendment. And the couple’s claim is that this process is not 
the one “due” to them in light of the significance of the deprived interest. A more 
rigorous legal process—for example, a federal constitutional ban on same-sex 
marriage—would have extinguished the couple’s constitutional claim. A less 
rigorous but categorically distinct legal process—a determination by a Supreme 
Court majority that the state had sufficient reason to deny the license and that its 
denial bore a sufficient relationship to that interest—also would have extinguished 
the couple’s claim. As it turns out, the state’s process for effecting its deprivation 
of liberty was held to be inadequate—i.e., not due—and hence the availability of 
same-sex marriage is now the law of the land. 
On this view, substantive due process is not, as Ely would have it, a mandate 
to review the “merits” of governmental action but is instead a mandate to determine 
which of a long menu of procedural boxes fits a particular kind of state deprivation. 
Justice Scalia is right that the text speaks of process, but in adding that “process” 
means a “validly enacted law and a fair trial,” he concedes that the clause requires 
judges to determine which laws are validly enacted and which trials are fair. These 
are substantive questions. Accordingly, Judge Bork cannot mean that the Due 
Process Clause requires only that the substance of “any” law be applied through 
fair procedures; he would insist, I assume, that the clause further require, as Justice 
Scalia implies, that those laws be enacted by constitutionally competent lawmakers. 
And who is competent to enact a particular law must depend, in part, on what the 
law does. Likewise, Professor Tribe skips a step when he takes “the rules of conduct 
government promulgates” as given rather than as the outcome of a process whose 
fairness must be matched to the nature and scope of the deprived life, liberty, or 
property. Finally, it is simply wrong, pace Judge Posner, to say that a substantive 
due process claimant thinks no procedural safeguard would be adequate to justify 
the deprivation, since a valid constitutional amendment or a law passed in 
satisfaction of strict judicial scrutiny would suffice (even if they are not the relief 
the claimant seeks). Put another way, the claim is not that a challenged deprivation 
may not occur regardless of the process that attends it; it is that the deprivation may 
not occur in light of the process that effected it. 
Conceived in this way, it is easy to see how due process may be 
conceptualized along a loose (and perhaps overlapping) spectrum from what we 
tend to see as its procedural to its substantive elements. This is so because multiple 
ambiguities enable a diversity of “processes” to satisfy the textual commands of the 
Due Process Clause.22 For a relatively minor deprivation, such as the $23.50 in 
hobby materials allegedly lost by Nebraska corrections officials in Parratt v. 
                                                 
22 Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 90 (“The language of 
the [Due Process Clauses] . . . . could mean just about anything.”). 
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Taylor,23 due process of law might be no more than the availability of a state tort 
system. For a more serious deprivation, such as the loss of life-sustaining but 
statutorily defined welfare benefits in Goldberg v. Kelly,24 a pre-deprivation 
administrative hearing is “due.” For marginal deprivations of certain fundamental 
rights, ordinary, non-arbitrary legislation might be enough,25 but for absolute 
deprivations, the Constitution must be amended or the legislation must be subject 
to review by an independent adjudicator—a panel of judges—employing certain 
standards of necessity and fit.26 
The path from procedural to substantive requirements for legislative or 
judicial review is not necessarily linear in respect to the severity of the deprivation. 
Bert Taylor, Jr. could likely have raised a substantive due process objection had his 
$23.50 in hobby materials been deprived intentionally rather than negligently,27 but 
John Kelly had no substantive entitlement to intentionally deprived benefits that 
had kept him from homelessness.28 Still, the language of “fundamental” rights as 
the trigger for substantive due process suggests that strict scrutiny or constitutional 
amendment are the bulwarks against deprivations that are categorically more 
substantial than the ordinary liberty and property interests that trigger procedural 
due process protection. 
Claims that substantive due process doctrine describes an approach to a set 
of rights whose deprivation is never allowed, no matter the process,29 apply only to 
absolute, non-derogable rights.30 It is possible that such rights exist in the American 
system—the right against genocide, say31—but the steady assault on substantive 
due process does not have these kinds of jus cogens norms in mind. 
                                                 
23 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
24 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
25 See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. 
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992) (Joint Op.); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 387 (1978). 
26 Crawford v. Marion Cty. Board of Elec., 553 U.S. 181, 434 (2008); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388. 
27 Indeed, though Parratt was decided as a procedural due process case, Richard Fallon has argued 
that because Taylor complained that the state lacked adequate reasons for effecting the loss of his 
hobby materials, the underlying grievance was better understood in substantive due process terms. 
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 341–43 (1993); see also Parratt, 451 U.S. at 552–53 (Powell, 
J., concurring in the result) (noting that the Court’s holding that there had been a deprivation in a 
constitutional sense raises the possibility that the state violated substantive due process). 
28 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
29 See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
30 See Peter J. Rubin, Square Pegs and Round Holes: Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due 
Process, and the Bill of Rights, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 882 (2003). Even this is debatable, since 
the word “due” could arguably contemplate that for certain deprivations, no process could justify 
them. 
31 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(a) & cmt. n. 
8 
 
 Two overlapping objections deserve elaboration. First, there is a pleading 
issue. A procedural due process claim typically prays for procedural protection to 
attach to the complained of deprivation. A substantive due process claim does not 
typically pray for a constitutional amendment or for strict judicial scrutiny and no 
more. The crux of the complaint is that the deprivation should be voided; 
conditional relief giving the jurisdiction the opportunity to amend the Constitution 
would be not just procedurally odd but would greatly displease the plaintiff. The 
sense in which a claim is substantive rather than procedural in nature pertains to the 
relief the plaintiff seeks, not the relief that would eliminate his cause of action. The 
plaintiff’s substantive due process complaint directs the court’s energy towards 
whether the law is a proper one, which is an unmistakably substantive question, 
distinguishable from questions of notice, an opportunity to be heard, the availability 
of counsel, and burdens of production and persuasion. 
Any claim that substantive and procedural due process do not involve 
distinct analysis would need to meet this objection, but that is not this Part’s claim. 
The distinction between substantive and procedural due process is intelligible, even 
if there is significant ambiguity on the margins. A due process violation requires 
that the asserted life, liberty, or property interest pass some threshold of importance 
and that it be deprived without crossing some other threshold of regularity or 
consistency with the way in which meaningfully similar rights are deprived. 
Substantive due process claims focus on the first of these thresholds while 
procedural claims focus on the second, and in both cases it is typically assumed that 
the other threshold has been crossed. Thus, these argument types are indeed 
distinct, and constitutional lawyers, judges, and scholars tend to know them when 
they see them. The claim of this Part is simply that the same text—“nor shall any 
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law”—
accommodates both argument types.  
A second objection to the analysis in this Part is grounded in the difficulty 
in severing textual argument from doctrine and history. The hypothetical 
substantive due process claim that opens this Part seems to track the words of the 
Due Process Clause and, if successful, vindicates the couple’s substantive interest 
in marrying each other. But lawyers, especially those trained in common law 
systems, will immediately, indeed instinctively, see a problem with this proposed 
reconciliation. Some might argue that neither a constitutional amendment nor 
judicial application of strict scrutiny counts as a “process” within the meaning of 
the term “due process of law.” The processes the Due Process Clause contemplates 
are those such as notice of adverse claims, an opportunity to be heard before a 
neutral decisionmaker, with the benefit of counsel and certain evidentiary 
protections, and so forth. Perhaps a handful of those lawyers will allow that the Due 
Process Clause might be concerned as well with the legislative procedures attending 
9 
 
a challenged law, or to the process of judicial review itself. But in that case, the 
kinds of infirmities that would make these processes “undue” are not what our 
hypothetical has in mind. An “undue” legislative process is one that, say, lacks a 
quorum, operates under a non-majoritarian voting rule, or includes unelected 
legislators.32 An “undue” judicial review process is one conducted by a biased or 
(literally) incompetent judge.33 The notion that the process of ordinary lawmaking 
is not “due” because an interest is sufficiently fundamental to require a process of 
constitutional amendment, or that the process of rational basis judicial review is not 
“due” because the interest at stake requires strict scrutiny, will strike the common 
lawyer as casuistic. 
 Whatever the virtues of this effort to recover a textual argument against 
substantive due process, it does not rely on the text, at least not in a way that Ely’s 
joke has the resources to describe. For illumination, consider an example borrowed 
from Lon Fuller, which he in turn borrowed from John Austin.34 Austin puzzled 
over the erstwhile English legal fiction, expounded by Blackstone, that “husband 
and wife are one person.”35 Austin writes, “I rather impute such fictions to the sheer 
imbecility (or, if you will, to the active and sportive fancies) of their grave and 
venerable authors, than to any deliberate design, good or evil.”36 From a narrow 
perspective, it would be oxymoronic to say that husband and wife are one person, 
no less than to say that two is equal to one.  
But as Fuller notes, Austin’s complaint was not really against the use of 
language but rather against the claim being made about the legal relation between 
husband and wife.37 Even from the internal perspective of English law, husband 
and wife were not a unit for all purposes: “When it is said . . . ‘that husband and 
wife are one person,’ the meaning merely is, that they lie under certain incapacities 
with respect to one another. And where those incapacities do not intervene, the 
fiction of their unity ceases, and they are deemed twain.”38 Calling the phrase 
                                                 
32 See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEBRASKA L. REV. 197, 240 (1976). 
33 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (holding that due process of law requires 
judicial recusal where significant judicial election contributions by a litigant to a judge in his or her 
case create an appearance of bias); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (permitting 
administrative adjudication of private rights so long as final adjudication was available in Article 
III courts); Martin H. Redish & Jennifer Aronoff, The Real Constitutional Problem with State 
Judicial Selection: Due Process, Judicial Retention, and the Dangers of Popular Constitutionalism, 
56 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1 (2014) (arguing that judicial elections violate the Due Process Clause). 
34 See L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1930). 
35 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 630 
(1873); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769) 
442–45. 
36 AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 631. 
37 See Fuller, supra note 34, at 387. 
38 AUSTIN, supra note 35, at 630. 
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“imbecilic” draws rhetorical leverage from the absurdity of the language, taken 
narrowly, but Austin’s disagreement with Blackstone is, in the end, a legal dispute, 
and a pedantic one at that. Fuller likens “husband and wife are one” to the statement, 
“A has a legal right against B to payment of $100.”39 Knowing that A has a legal 
right does not, without more, tell us “whether A may forcibly take $100 from B’s 
pocket, nor whether A may have B jailed if B refuses to pay the $100. For the 
particulars, [we] must go elsewhere.”40  
Likewise, to understand why substantive due process sounds oxymoronic 
requires more than a knowledge of the English language. For the particulars, we 
must tap into a certain, and notably incomplete, legal tradition. Abstracted from any 
such tradition at a particular point in time, “due process of law” is a meaningless 
string of words.41 It acquires meaning as a legal term through its use in the law. The 
strongest version of this point would draw on the hermeneutic tradition and observe 
that all language is culturally and temporally situated, such that no phrase whose 
meaning is understood by its speakers or listeners could possibly be a nonsensical 
juxtaposition of opposites. “Jumbo shrimp” evokes RED LOBSTER®, not confusion. 
Indeed, we might better define an oxymoron not as a contradiction-in-terms but 
instead as a paradox, a superficial internal tension that abates on reflection.42 
Substantive due process is just such a paradox, and so calling it an oxymoron 
reflects rather than undermines its inherent consistency. 
But we need not take a detour into the philosophy of language to understand 
that “due process of law” has meant different things to different actors at different 
points in the history of American law. No less an authority than Antonin Scalia 
provided a guided tour of those meanings in his concurring opinion in Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance v. Haslip.43 The Haslip Court rejected a substantive due 
process claim by an insurance company complaining about the size of a punitive 
damages award. Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment but would have held that 
any procedurally sound punitive damages award that did not violate the Bill of 
Rights satisfied the Due Process Clause.44 In so arguing, he offered a standard 
account of the origins of the due process language in the U.S. Constitution.  
The clause seems first to have appeared in a 1354 English statute: “No man 
of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken 
nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer 
                                                 
39 Fuller, supra note 34, at 388. 
40 Id. 
41 See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 90. 
42 See Marvin K.L. Ching, A Literary and Linguistic Analysis of Compact Verbal Paradox, 26 
COLLEGE COMPOSITION & COMM. 384, 384 (1975). 
43 499 U.S. 1, 24 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
44 See id. at 24–25. 
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by due process of the law.”45 Despite conflicting historical evidence,46 the English 
jurist Sir Edward Coke thought the term was identical to the phrase “Law of the 
Land” (per legem terrae) as used in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta: “No Freeman 
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free 
Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we not 
pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful Judgment of his Peers, or by the 
Law of the Land.”47 The “law of the land” meant the customary adjudicative 
procedures under the English common law.48 
American colonists, familiar with Coke, incorporated “law of the land” 
language into eighteenth century state constitutions, and the same basic meaning—
according to customary English procedures—survived as the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.49 In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken 
Land & Improvement Co.,50 decided in 1856, the Court affirmed Coke’s translation 
but also noted that the provision constrained “the legislature as well as . . . the 
executive and judicial powers of the government.”51 
The Court’s first significant elaboration of the meaning of the clause 
subsequent to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment came in Hurtado v. 
California, an 1884 decision in which a convicted murderer argued, unsuccessfully, 
that due process of law required a grand-jury indictment.52 Justice Scalia’s Haslip 
concurrence takes from Hurtado that historical practice is sufficient but not 
necessary to qualify as due process of law.53 A procedure not blessed by history 
would be invalid if it failed to comport with “those fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.”54 Justice 
Scalia’s opinion notes that by 1934, when the Court decided Snyder v. 
                                                 
45 Id. at 28 (quoting Liberty of Subject, 1354, 28 Edw. 3, ch. 3 (Eng.)). 
46 See Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 
19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265, 267 (1975) (“[T]he provision seems merely to require that the 
appropriate writ be used to summon the accused before the court to answer the complaints against 
him.”). 
47 Haslip, 499 U.S. at (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 9 Hen. III, ch. 29 (1225)); 
See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON 
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION *351–*353 (1st ed. 1868). 
48 See Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, at 28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
49 Id. at 29. 
50 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
51 Id. at 276. 
52 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
53 See id. at 31–32. Justice Scalia’s opinion understates the breadth of the Hurtado Court’s reading 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
54 Id. at 32 (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535). 
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Massachusetts,55 consistency with the principles of “fundamental justice” seemed 
to have become a necessary condition of all procedures to satisfy the Constitution.56 
Although historical practice carried great and perhaps dispositive weight 
according to the Snyder Court, Justice Scalia writes that incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights against the states caused cleavage between historical practice and what the 
Bill of Rights required.57 The Court came to the view that its own interpretations of 
the Bill of Rights, developed in the context of exclusive application to the federal 
government, also set a lower bound for what qualified as fundamental fairness. This 
conflation meant that states that violated the Bill of Rights as previously defined by 
the Court automatically violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.58 Over time, and unsurprisingly, the Court began to understand the 
Due Process Clause to prohibit any practice that failed a test of “fundamental 
fairness,” no matter its historical pedigree and no matter its relationship to the 
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.59 In Haslip, decided a quarter century ago, 
Justice Scalia’s opinion traces this analysis to “due process opinions in recent 
decades.”60 
 Justice Scalia’s tour of the history of the Due Process Clause effectively 
makes the point that substantive due process is not a contradiction in terms. Due 
process of law is meaningless in the abstract, extracted from its historical situation. 
It once seems to have meant “according to ‘specific writs employed in the English 
courts.’”61 Later, it meant “according to the law of the land,” a phrase that itself 
seemed to refer to customary English procedure. Later, it meant “according to 
traditional practice” or “according to the tenets of fundamental justice.” Later, and 
for at least the past several decades, it has meant “according to principles of 
fundamental fairness,” a concededly substantive standard. 
 And there is more. At least two other definitions of due process of law 
emerged during the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century and thus 
can be assumed to have influenced the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.62 On 
one view, due process of law would be violated by a law that defeated vested 
property rights by denying compensation after a taking or by transferring property 
                                                 
55 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
56 See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 33 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
57 See id. at 34–35. 
58 See id. at 35. 
59 See id. at 36. 
60 Id. at 36 (emphasis added). 
61 Id. at 28. 
62 See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. 
REV. 366, 375 (1911); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 493, 498 (1997); Williams, supra note 7, at 416, 423–25. 
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from one private person to another.63 On another related but broader view, due 
process of law required that laws be appropriately general and prospective rather 
than class-based, retrospective, or arbitrary.64 On either view, the Due Process 
Clause binds the legislature and extends beyond mere procedural regularity. Note 
as well that just about everyone agrees that the American usage of “due process of 
law” is synonymous with “by the law of the land,” a phrase that, though likely a 
reference to procedures, does not explicitly refer to process.65 Was per legem terrae 
also a contradiction in terms? Or is it rather that the text is not literal and therefore 
not susceptible to denotation as an oxymoron in any but a trivial sense?66 
Justice Scalia has exhaustively worked out a theory that tells us which of 
the many definitions of due process of law is the one judges in constitutional cases 
should adopt.67 But to say that the traditional understanding of a legal term (much 
less one traditional understanding among others) just is its current textual meaning 
confuses a theory of language with a theory of interpretation.68 And so, as we might 
have suspected all along, the claim that substantive due process is a contradiction 
in terms is really just a volley in the eternal debates over constitutional 
interpretation. Those debates are deeply contested and it really is very helpful for 
one side to be able to say, credibly on the surface, that the other side’s position 
disobeys the rules of English. Revealing the sparseness of the textual argument 
against substantive due process unstacks the deck. 
II 
 As noted, inconsistency with the text is hardly the sole objection to 
substantive due process. One could reject substantive due process for at least as 
many reasons as there are forms of orthodox constitutional argument. One could 
argue that it is inconsistent with the intentions or understandings of the framers of 
the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments; that it resurrects repudiated precedents such 
as Lochner or Dred Scott; that it requires substantive value judgments in a 
                                                 
63 See Harrison, supra note 62, at 506–20. 
64 See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535–36 (“It is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. It must be 
not a special rule for a particular person or a particular case, but . . . the general law, . . . and thus 
[excludes] . . . special, partial and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation.”).  
65 Although many scholars doubt that Coke was right to equate the phrases, see, e.g., Corwin, supra 
note 62, few doubt that Americans relied on Coke’s views. See Charles M. Hough, Due Process of 
Law—To-day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 218 (1919). 
66 It would then not be a contradiction in terms but would be a true oxymoron—a term whose literal 
sense is not interesting. See Brian Cummings, Literally Speaking, or, the Literal Sense from 
Augustine to Lacan, 21 PARAGRAPH 200, 218 (1998). 
67 See generally SCALIA, supra note 16 (expounding textualist-originalist theories of interpretation). 
68 Cf. Fuller, supra note 34, at 377 (arguing that the claim that a word is a fiction “must be based 
ultimately on the notion that the word . . . has reached the legitimate end of its evolution and that it 
ought to be pinned down where it now is”). 
14 
 
Constitution that prizes judicial regulation through procedure; or that it encourages 
judges to engage in policymaking at the expense of democracy. We have heard all 
of these complaints before. It would be surprising if no one before Ely thought to 
supplement these arguments with the simple observation that substantive due 
process is a nonsense phrase that makes hash of the text, but that isn’t far from the 
truth. The phrase “substantive due process” has been in legal circulation since at 
least the 1920s,69 but it is surprisingly difficult to find criticisms of either the term 
itself or its underlying concept that are framed in textual terms prior to the 1980s.  
In fact, I am aware of only three authors to have referred to substantive due 
process as either an oxymoron or a contradiction in terms before Ely did so in 
1980.70 The earliest such reference appears in a 1956 Canadian law review article 
by W.F. Bowker, who was then the dean of the law school at the University of 
Alberta.71 Bowker was comparing property rights in Canada and the United States 
and noted that although the due process clause seemed to place no substantive 
limitations on legislation affecting property rights, it had been interpreted 
otherwise. “Thus,” Bowker wrote, “grew the concept of ‘substantive due process,’ 
a contradiction in terms to be sure, but one that for about a half a century ending 
just before World War II operated to impose severe restrictions on economic 
legislation.”72 
The second reference comes in historian Leonard Levy’s introduction to 
Robert McCloskey’s classic defense of economic due process that appears in an 
edited volume of essays on the U.S. Constitution.73 Levy criticizes McCloskey for 
failing to acknowledge that substantive due process “was always a judicially 
contrived, oxymoronic concept that distorted history, logic, and plain meaning.”74 
The certitude of Levy’s skepticism here is mysterious. Levy has in other writing 
conceded that a version of substantive due process is historically available (if 
inconclusive), and moreover that the Due Process Clause is “written in language 
that blocks fixed meanings.”75 
                                                 
69 See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Judicial Decisions in Their Substantive Law Aspect Under the 
Due Process Clause, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 619, 619 (1928) (defining “substantive due process”). 
70 I do not doubt that there are others, but I have not found them. 
71 See W.F. Bowker, Protection of Basic Rights and Liberties, 2 U. B.C. LEGAL NOTES 281, 281, 
311 (1956). 
72 Id. at 311. 
73 Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme 
Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 
157 (Leonard W. Levy ed. 1966). 
74 Id. 
75 LEONARD W. LEVY, SEASONED JUDGMENTS: THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, RIGHTS, AND 
HISTORY 120 (1995). 
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Finally, Hermine Herta Meyer, a Justice Department lawyer, referred to 
substantive due process as “self-contradictory,” “a contradiction in terms,” and “an 
invention of American judges” in a 1972 law review article defending the pretrial 
detention procedures of the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1970.76 Meyer’s article appears to have been part of a coordinated 
effort by members of the Nixon Justice Department to influence how courts would 
treat legislative bail reform.77 Meyer later called substantive due process a 
“nonsense phrase” in her 1977 book on the history of the Fourteenth Amendment 
published by the vanity publisher Vantage Press.78 
It is perilous to draw conclusions from this small (and likely underinclusive) 
sample of pre-1980s references to the internally contradictory character of 
substantive due process, but it is difficult not to notice that none of the three was a 
lawyer raised in the United States. Bowker was a Canadian lawyer, Levy a 
nonlawyer born in Canada, and Meyer a German lawyer who immigrated to the 
United States as an adult. This coincidence suggests (if dimly) the possibility that 
a superficially available textual argument against substantive due process was 
nonetheless foreign to the American legal culture.79 The canonical critique was 
located outside the text. 
 The origin of substantive due process is sometimes traced to Chief Justice 
Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott.80 This accusation (le mot juste) is better rhetoric 
than it is legal history,81 but its accuracy is not presently important. It is enough to 
say that the opinion may plausibly be read as holding that a law prohibiting slavery 
in federal territories violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because 
                                                 
76 Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1381, 1417 (1972). 
77 See Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 
909, 958-59 (2013). 
78 HERMINE HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 127 
(1977). 
79 In case it is not clear from the main text, I do not wish to overstate this point. Bowker received 
his LL.M. degree from the University of Minnesota, see Bowker, supra note 71, at 281, Levy is a 
Pulitzer Prize-winning American constitutional historian, see LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION (1968), and Meyer became a 
prominent federal government lawyer, see Hegreness, supra note 77, at 958–59. Still, whether one’s 
exposure to the domestic legal culture occurs during one’s formative professional years or at some 
other time might plausibly affect one’s instincts towards a legal term of art such as due process of 
law. In particular, judicial review in Canada did not extend to constitutional rights at the time of 
Bowker’s writing, and the Continental civil law tradition rejects the kind of evolutionary 
jurisprudence that gave birth to substantive due process. 
80 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 11, at 31. 
81 See James W. Ely, Jr. The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of 
Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMM. 315, 318 (1999). 
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it deprives slaveholders of vested property rights in their slaves.82 The dissenters, 
Justice McLean and Justice Curtis, disputed this holding on the merits but neither 
of them questioned the applicability of the Due Process Clause as a substantive 
limitation on legislative activity. 
Likewise, in Lochner v. New York, the chief error of which has frequently 
been described as its resort to substantive due process,83 neither of the two 
dissenting opinions suggested that the Due Process Clause is or should be 
concerned only with adjudicative procedures.84 Justice Harlan explicitly endorsed 
substantive due process85 but found the Bakeshop Act reasonable.86 Justice Holmes 
counseled legislative deference—what we today would call rational basis review—
but his opinion nonetheless rests on the view that the Due Process Clause requires 
judges to inquire into “fundamental principles as they have been understood by the 
traditions of our people and our law.”87 Holmes betrayed no textual or other 
principled objection to substantive due process: “General propositions do not 
decide concrete cases.”88 
There is some evidence that Louis Brandeis, the other great dissenter of the 
Lochner era, believed, as a matter of principle, that the Due Process Clause should 
be limited to procedural irregularities. Felix Frankfurter noted as much in 
transcribing a 1923 conversation with Brandeis in which the latter is reported to 
have said further that, so long as due process is recognized as having a substantive 
component, it must be applied to those rights that are truly fundamental such as 
speech and education.89 Brandeis’s contingent adoption of substantive due process 
reflects his position in Meyer v. Nebraska90 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters91—both 
                                                 
82 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1957). The “substantive due process” holding, which does not use the precise 
term, is notoriously opaque. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 382 (1978). 
83 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514–16 (Black, J., dissenting). 
84 See Corwin, supra note 62, at 367; John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1561, 1561–62 (2006). 
85 198 U.S. 45, 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Granting then that there is a liberty of contract which 
cannot be violated even under the sanction of direct legislative enactment . . . .”). 
86 Id. at 69–73. 
87 Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
88 Id. Indeed, although Holmes dissented from the Court’s substantive due process holding in Meyer 
v. Nebraska, see Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 412 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting), he joined the 
unanimous opinion in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), without any separate writing. 
Moreover, his dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), suggested a (perhaps 
grudging) commitment to substantive protection of rights via Due Process Clause. See id. at 672 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
89 Melvin I. Urofsky, The Brandeis-Frankfurter Conversations, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 320. 
90 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
91 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
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education cases in which Brandeis joined the majority’s substantive due process 
holding—and in Gilbert v. Minnesota,92 in which he dissented from the Court’s 
opinion upholding a Minnesota anti-sedition law. After recounting the Court’s 
series of substantive due process holdings in the economic realm, Brandies wrote 
in Gilbert, “I cannot believe that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment includes only liberty to acquire and to enjoy property.”93 
Justice Brandeis’s reluctant acceptance of substantive due process is also of 
course reflected in his famous concurring opinion in Whitney v. California.94 
“Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive,” he wrote, 
“it is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.”95 I am not aware of 
any writings in which Brandeis specified what, precisely, those persuasive 
arguments comprised. This point is significant in itself. Brandeis’s approach to law 
was intensely fact-specific, not given to pronouncements of what legal provisions 
mean in a metaphysical sense. It was appropriate to his life as an advocate that the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause could be settled through legal argumentation 
and precedent and not thereafter revisited ex tabula rasa. Moreover, as his Gilbert 
dissent reflects, Justice Brandeis’s views on the Due Process Clause are inseparable 
from his views on the property rights with which the clause had always been 
associated in its substantive form. 
His disciple Frankfurter likewise agreed with Brandeis about the procedural 
connotations of substantive due process96 but likewise seemed motivated less by 
any philosophical objection than by distaste for the results he observed. Like 
Brandeis, Frankfurter supported the Court’s decisions in Meyer and Pierce, but he 
thought that liberty-protecting decisions such as those could not justify the cost of 
property-protecting decisions like Lochner and Coppage v. Kansas.97 As a judge, 
Frankfurter gave no hint of dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause 
forbids certain significant rights deprivations.98 He joined several opinions in which 
the Court overturned (or the joined dissent would have overturned) non-procedural 
                                                 
92 254 U.S. 325 (1920). 
93 Id. at 343 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
94 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
95 Id. at 373. 
96 Urofsky, supra note 89, at 320; Frankfurter, The Red Terror of Judicial Reform, 40 NEW REPUBLIC 
110, 113 (1924) (“[T]he due process clauses ought to go.”). 
97 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating legislation that forbid yellow-dog contracts); see Felix 
Frankfurter, Can the Supreme Court Guarantee Toleration?, unsigned editorial, 43 NEW REPUBLIC 
85, 86 (1925), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 195, 
196. 
98 See Louis H. Pollak, Mr. Justice Frankfurter: Judgment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 67 YALE 
L.J. 304, 317 (1957). 
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state laws as violations of due process;99 concurring in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 
overturning a state-level subversive activities prosecution, Justice Frankfurter 
wrote that striking a balance between a citizen’s right to political privacy and the 
State’s right to self-protection “is the inescapable judicial task in giving substantive 
content, legally enforced, to the Due Process Clause.”100 To be sure, Frankfurter, 
like Holmes, believed deeply in legislative deference.101 But that did not mean the 
Court should stay altogether out of the business of ensuring that, as Justice Jackson 
wrote, joined by Frankfurter, “reasonable general legislation [is] reasonably applied 
to the individual.”102  
 To recap, none of the great opponents of substantive due process prior to 
the 1960s opposed it on textual grounds. As discussed below, that omission results 
in part from an intellectual temperament within the constitutional culture that was 
less literalist and, relatedly, less worshipful of the constitutional text and its 
authors.103  
                                                 
99 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
100 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 267 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). 
101 See Pollak, supra note 98. 
102 Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953). 
103 See Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 
335 (2015). 
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Discussion of substantive due process among constitutional lawyers and 
commentators grew dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 1 reproduces an 
Ngram of references to “substantive due process” in English-language books 
digitally catalogued by Google Books from 1920 to 2008.104 The Ngram illustrates 
a sharp upward trend with an inflection point at 1965, the year in which the Supreme 
Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut105 and four years after the Court decided 
Griswold’s predecessor case, Poe v. Ullman.106 Griswold, which overturned a 
Connecticut ban on contraceptive use, drew plenty of fire, including from the 
dissenting opinions of Justice Black and Justice Stewart. But neither opinion argues 
that the Due Process Clause applies only to “process.” Justice Black opposed 
                                                 
104 Google books Ngram Viewer, available at  
https://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=substantive+due+process&year_start=1920&yea
r_end=2008&corpus=15&smoothing=3&share=&direct_url=t1%3B%2Csubstantive%20due%20p
rocess%3B%2Cc0 (search run Aug. 9, 2015). The table has a smoothing of 3, which means that 
each year represents an average of that year’s value and the values of the three years before and 
after. Also, the values are reported as a percentage of the complete catalog for any given year, which 
makes it unlikely that the trend is driven by changes in the denominator rather than the numerator. 
It is difficult to say this with certainty, however, since we do not know how the proportion of books 
in the dataset relating to constitutional law varies over time. 
105 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
106 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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Griswold and other substantive due process holdings on the ground that they 
protected rights that were not explicit in the constitutional text and therefore granted 
an inappropriate amount of discretion to judges.107 Justice Stewart joined Justice 
Black’s opinion and opposed the decision on similar democratic process 
grounds.108 
 The structure of Justice Douglas’s majority opinion likely influenced the 
locus of criticism. Justice Douglas did not follow Lochner in arguing that the Due 
Process Clause, of its own force, authorizes judges to inquire into the substantive 
reasonableness of state laws. Rather, he argued that the Connecticut anti-
contraceptive law touched on interests implicated in a constitutional right to privacy 
that, as a positive matter, could be located within the interstices of the text of the 
Bill of Rights.109 This approach proved an easy target. Representing the right to 
privacy as a “penumbra” or “emanation” from the Constitution seemed a reach to 
many, one that exposed a deficit in serious arguments in favor of such rights. 
Grounding the interests Douglas sought to protect more directly in the Due Process 
Clause—as the opinions of Justice Goldberg, Justice Harlan, and Justice White all 
sought to do in different ways110—was more open to criticism based on Lochnerism 
but was, by comparison, a more textualist approach. 
 Consistent with that observation, the dominant criticisms of substantive due 
process in the decade following Griswold tended to be prudential rather than 
textual. Thus, Alexander Bickel and Philip Kurland rejected a constitutional right 
to privacy or otherwise objected to Griswold or Roe on the merits.111 Both believed 
in incorporation via the Due Process Clause. Neither appeared to view the text as 
compelling a procedural focus. Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Roe also did not 
object to substantive due process tout court.112 Indeed, he argued that an abortion 
restriction without an exception for procedures thought necessary to save the 
pregnant woman’s life would violate the Due Process Clause.113 Even Robert Bork 
lodged no textual objection to the word “process.” Bork believed that any 
                                                 
107 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 510–21 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black’s belief in total 
incorporation, see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71–72 (Black, J., dissenting), would have 
made it incongruous for him to criticize Griswold as an unduly substantive use of the Due Process 
Clause. 
108 See 381 U.S. at 527–31 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
109 See id. at 481–84. 
110 Cites. 
111 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 27–28 (1977); PHILIP B. KURLAND, 
POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 161 (1973). 
112 See 410 U.S. at 172–73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White, who also dissented in Roe, was 
not opposed to substantive due process. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
113 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 173. 
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constitutional rights not specifically enumerated in the text requires judges to make 
impermissible value judgments, and so substantive due process was an invitation 
to activism rather than (necessarily) a perversion of the text.114 Indeed, Bork would 
sacrifice the text to judicial restraint. 
Textual arguments against the due process clause gained currency in the 
1980s, following Ely’s book. Since then, literally hundreds of authors, including 
several judges in the course of opinions, have called substantive due process 
oxymoronic or contradictory, and a fair number have cited Ely for that 
proposition.115 Notably, the first state or federal judge to have called substantive 
due process an oxymoron in a published opinion appears to have been Posner, who 
did so in a 1982 case in which (apparently without irony) he called the doctrine 
simultaneously “exotic” and “ubiquitous.”116 Judge Posner has referred to the 
phrase as oxymoronic several times since.117 
This trend surely says less about substantive due process, which meant 
about the same (if not less, substantively) in the 1980s as it did before, than it says 
about prevailing practices of constitutional argumentation. The more or less sudden 
realization that “substantive” contradicts “process” in the Due Process Clause—
and that this is a fatal defect—coincides with the rise of a certain kind of 
originalism. That rise was not organic but rather was deliberately orchestrated by 
conservative activists both inside and outside of the Reagan Justice Department.118 
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Indeed, a substantial number of the judicial opinions to have made textual criticisms 
of substantive due process—and the great majority of the appellate opinions—were 
written by appointees of that department.119 Two of those appellate judges, Danny 
Boggs of the Sixth Circuit and Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, worked 
under Bork in the Office of the Solicitor General in the 1970s. 
 Originalism does not, per se, support the view that substantive due process 
is contradictory. As noted, whether the framers of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments meant to endow the Due Process Clause with substantive content is a 
contested question, and the phrase “due process of law” has long been thought 
synonymous with “according to the law of the land,” which is not inherently 
procedural. The 1980s turn against the words instead reflects a particularly literal, 
acontextual, and politically opportunistic (if sincere) approach to historical 
argument: in the spirit of oxymorons, call it anachronistic originalism. 
Words in legal documents are not just their counterparts in ordinary speech. 
They are meant to be understood by their handlers—lawyers, usually—who operate 
under certain professional assumptions that may diverge from common speech 
conventions. This is not to say that legal documents, and especially constitutions, 
are not meant to be understood by non-lawyers; it is to say, rather, that even 
constitutions are not meant to be misunderstood by lawyers. It is telling that Justice 
Black, perhaps the most committed textualist in the Court’s history, did not believe 
the text of the Due Process Clause had a facially obvious meaning: “Some might 
think that the words themselves are vague,” he wrote in his dissenting opinion in In 
re Winship,120 “[b]ut any possible ambiguity disappears when the phrase is viewed 
in the light of history and the accepted meaning of those words prior to and at the 
time our Constitution was written.”121 The belief that “substantive” and “process” 
are necessarily, indeed risibly, in conflict transposes a modern, common-sense view 
of the meaning of English words onto words in eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
legal documents.  
For a non-originalist and a pragmatist like Posner,122 there is nothing 
untoward about this move. He does not, after all, reject substantive due process; he 
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120 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
121 Id. at 378 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black is referring to the words of the Fifth Amendment, 
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just thinks it sounds silly, and he’s right. For others, conflating the common sense 
meaning of today with the legal meaning of yesterday can go some way towards 
affecting the legal meaning of today. “It is not that ‘substantive’ due process is 
linguistically self-contradictory,” Henry Monaghan wrote in 1981. “It is not any 
longer, if one accepts the teachings of ordinary language philosophy that ‘meaning 
is use.’ The core problem is one of constitutional theory, not of language.”123 But 
adopting and promoting a constitutional theory that relies on language means that 
changing language meaning—as through “use”—serves one’s theory. Through 
sufficient repetition within the appropriate language community, the view that 
substantive due process is an oxymoron can become a self-fulfilling prophesy. If it 
was not an oxymoron in 1981, it is now—or so that was the goal. 
But there is more to it than this. Although the phrase substantive due process 
has been around for nearly a century, the category of claims it describes was more 
often simply called “due process” for much of that time. As substantive due process 
became more frequently invoked as a distinct constitutional claim, procedural due 
process—which seems redundant—also was invoked more often. Using two 
different words for something—making it some things—has cognitive in addition 
to linguistic consequences. Experiments in linguistics have demonstrated that the 
categories that exist within a particular language community influence participants’ 
perception of phenomena in the world. For example, native Spanish speakers tend 
strongly to associate objects with the genders grammatically assigned to them 
within the Spanish language, even if those assignments are arbitrary.124 Thus, 
consistent with patterns across languages, a native English speaker is likely to code 
natural objects as feminine and artificial objects as masculine; for Spanish speakers, 
this tendency is often overridden by the grammatical categories of Spanish.125 
 A soft form of linguistic relativity seems likely to influence judgments made 
within the language community of constitutional lawyers. Substantive due process 
peels away from procedural due process not just because of any underlying 
conceptual or semantic difference but also because they carry different labels. And 
as between these labels, procedural due process surely seems more “about” 
“process,” and therefore to have more conceptual integrity. Thus, the phrase 
“substantive due process” helps to generate the very textual anomaly that it is said 
to describe.  
III 
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 Substantive due process may not be a contradiction in terms, but it sounds 
like one. Comparing it to green pastel redness is funny, if a bit esoteric. Three of 
the most significant American legal figures of the last half century, representing 
wildly different jurisprudential and political ideologies—Ely, Posner, and Scalia—
have called substantive due process an oxymoron in prominent writings. Is that 
enough to make it one? Should it be enough? 
 A comparative example helps to sharpen the question. Discussions of 
linguistic relativity migrated into the culture long ago in the form of the old saw 
that there are x number of “Eskimo” words for snow. The observation is meant to 
show that language and perception are deeply interrelated. Linguist Laura Martin 
has described the observation itself, however, as a kind of folklore.126 It seems first 
to have originated in a 1911 article by the anthropologist Franz Boas, who 
mentioned four different Eskimo words for “snow” in an article about the difficulty 
in comparing language structures.127 Benjamin Whorf, a linguist, later popularized 
the example, mentioning five words for “snow,” though without naming any 
specific sources or data.128 Two important 1950s anthropological textbooks whose 
authors were influenced by Whorf mention the example. Martin says that one or 
both of those books “were probably read by most anthropologists trained between 
1960 and 1970, and by countless other students as well during that heyday of 
anthropology’s popularity.”129 By 1986, Martin was able to say that “[t]extbook 
references to the example have reached such proliferation that no complete 
inventory seems possible,”130 and that the example had deeply infiltrated pop 
culture: it appeared in a Lanford Wilson play,131 a trivia encyclopedia,132 a New 
York Times editorial,133 and on a local weather forecast. By the time it reached this 
last source, Boas’s four words had become “two hundred.”134 
The “Eskimo words for snow” tale is a meme, “an idea that becomes 
commonly shared through social transmission.”135 There is disagreement within the 
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memetics literature as to what more one can say about memes and the degree to 
which they possess the properties of evolving organisms or map onto existing social 
scientific understandings of diffusion of practices, beliefs, and other cultural 
artifacts.136 A technical definition is unnecessary to the basic, suggestive insight. 
The motivating ideas behind memes are that they are social—reproduction through 
human networks is an existential condition—and that they tend to replicate through 
imitation or absorption rather than through reflection.137 The jurisprudentially 
inclined will recognize this feature of meme transmission as “content-
independence,” a quality that also attaches to the authority of common law judicial 
precedents.138 
Memes are ubiquitous in American constitutional law. Indeed, the common 
law system encourages the transmission of legal information through shared 
understandings replicated by processes of imitation that risk mutating the original 
source.139 That imitation may be simple, as in a typical string cite, or it may be 
complex, as in the practice of referring to anticanonical cases to express 
methodological or substantive disagreement with an interlocutor. For example, 
citations to Lochner or to Dred Scott are not precedent-based in the usual sense but 
are better characterized as forms of ethical argument.140 Ethical argument draws 
upon the American self-conception as a source of interpretive authority.141 
Invocation of anticanonical cases is intended as a conversation-stopper, and the 
capacity of these cases to serve this function endows them with value beyond 
whatever underlying analogical power they may contribute.  
Much of what goes under the heading of blackletter constitutional law also 
has a memetic character. Owing to its complex relationship to politics and the 
magnitude of the (often capricious) Supreme Court’s role within it, constitutional 
law has a contingent character that resists hornbook formulations. For example, it 
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is common teaching that legislative abridgements of fundamental rights are 
reviewed under strict scrutiny, and yet it is remarkably difficult to find cases in 
which the Court has applied that standard. This is because, consistent with the thrust 
of this Essay, the Court in practice grades the reviewing standard by the gravity of 
the abridgement even as it rarely acknowledges a general practice of doing so.142 
Karl Llewelyn long ago recognized interpretive canons as having a similarly 
memetic structure: “to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, the canon 
must be sold, essentially, by means other than the use of the canon.”143 Canons are 
rhetorical resources, and Llewelyn’s memorable observation that each canon-based 
claim confronts an equally canonical counterclaim means to demonstrate, 
whimsically, that their proliferation is content-independent.144 
 Richard Primus has identified a related phenomenon as a “continuity 
tender,” which he defines as “an inherited ritual formula that one repeats to affirm 
a connection to one’s predecessors, not to endorse the content of that statement as 
one’s predecessors originally understood it.”145 For Primus, a continuity tender is a 
kind of rote incantation that serves a symbolic link to the past, on the order of Royal 
Assent to statutes passed by the British parliament.146 “Be it enacted by the Queen’s 
Most Excellent Majesty . . . .” serves the same community-building purpose that 
other rituals serve, but it has no practical significance.147 Primus’s motivating U.S. 
constitutional example is the notion that the federal government is a government of 
enumerated powers. Courts recite this principle in constitutional cases in order to 
emphasize a core ethical commitment of American constitutionalism,148 but in 
practice Congress has come to have a general police power.149 
 All continuity tenders are memes but not all memes are continuity tenders. 
Repetition of a constitutional meme need not serve the purpose of symbolic 
continuity with the past. It might alternatively serve as a kind of cognitive shortcut, 
or heuristic.150 Constitutional decisionmaking can be difficult. The resources for 
                                                 
142 See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny 
in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
143 Karl N. Llewelyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About 
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). 
144 See id. at 401–06. 
145 Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters (March 25, 2015), MICH. L. REV., forthcoming 2016, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2471924.  
146 See id. at 8. 
147 See id. at 8–9. 
148 See PHILIP C. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20 (1991). 
149 See Primus, supra note 145, at 14. 
150 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974); see also BALKIN, supra note 137, at 58–59 (describing the role of certain 
memes that act as “cognitive filters”); cf. Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 
CAL. L. REV. 635, 676 (2012) (“[I]nformation seekers expend as little effort as they can. Given a 
27 
 
resolving such cases—typically identified as text, history, structure, precedent, and 
consequences—can be mutually inconsistent, and there is no consensus on how (or 
whether) to assign weights among them.151 Cognitive heuristics can place the 
interpreter into a frame of mind that streamlines decisionmaking, and particular 
memes can be vehicles for these heuristics. 
 Consider two heuristics that are pervasive within legal argument: the affect 
and expertise heuristics. The affect heuristic involves reliance on whether a 
potential risk is emotionally coded as “good” or “bad.”152 This heuristic is critical 
to System 1, or experiential, thinking, which “encodes reality in images, metaphors, 
and narratives to which affective feelings have become attached.”153 The expertise 
heuristic involves reliance on expert validation as a quick-and-ready measure of the 
accuracy of a particular judgment.154 Legal arguments, including those offered by 
constitutional judges, make frequent use both of appeals to emotion (including 
through humor) and of appeals to authority.155 Appeals of those sorts align 
constitutional argument with other modes of practical discourse, as they 
correspond, respectively, with the pathetic and ethical modes of persuasion first 
identified by Aristotle.156 
 The association of the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron meme with a 
joke by Ely, and subsequently with the views of other leading figures in 
constitutional law, enables legal audiences—including judges, lawyers, and 
nonlawyers—to process its underlying content using heuristics. This is not to say 
that the presence of the meme disables systematic processing—both systematic and 
heuristic processing can occur in relation to the same proposition—nor is it to say 
that commentators must be wrong that substantive due process is an oxymoron. 
One could disagree with the analysis in Part I and it would still be the case that the 
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ways in which the substantive-due-process-as-oxymoron meme is typically 
communicated make its truth or falsity less relevant to its capacity to persuade. As 
Michael Fried writes, “Memes, like genes, will succeed if they are good replicators, 
whether or not they are correct or good for their human carriers.”157 
 There is reason, though, for constitutional lawyers to be less bothered by 
this possibility than linguists are bothered by apocryphal claims about Eskimo 
words. Martin’s article on the words-for-snow meme provoked a vigorous scholarly 
debate over the accuracy of the underlying proposition.158 Whether the different 
descriptors for snow in various dialects of Eskimo and Inuit languages are really 
compound words atop a small and uninteresting set of roots or whether the dozens 
of words for snow and snow-related phenomena are each lexically distinct and 
worthy of study is of great importance to linguists and anthropologists who focus 
on indigenous languages.159 Notably for our purposes, the fact that local 
weathermen appear to believe that there are 200 Eskimo words for snow (within a 
given dialect, the laugh line assumes) is of no moment to the serious debate among 
language professionals. They are simply different discourses, between which any 
influence, such as it may be, is unidirectional, from the Benjamin Whorfs of the 
world down to the Brick Tamlands. 
 Constitutional law obeys a different epistemology. It is primarily the 
product of a “constitutional culture” of nonjudicial actors whose values and beliefs 
it incorporates.160 This observation is nearly axiomatic among political scientists, 
and it is broadly shared by constitutional lawyers as well.161 Constitutional law 
takes its cues from—sits in dialogue with—legal understandings embedded within 
the broader culture, and relies on that culture for validation. Standard accounts of 
court decisionmaking understand certain prudential mechanisms from the 
perspective of the need for the law, as Neil Siegel writes, “to account for the 
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conditions of its own legitimation.”162 As Robert Post notes, “the Court must find 
a way to articulate constitutional law that the nation can accept as its own.”163 
 The upshot of this perspective is that, in constitutional law, persuasion 
carries independent normative weight. The value of persuasion in constitutional law 
is not merely instrumental or practical, as it is in other domains, but is also semantic. 
Constitutional law that fails to evolve with and seek affirmation from the people it 
governs not only fails descriptively, when it comes to the U.S. Constitution, but is 
also tyrannical.164 And so it counts against a constitutional proposition that the 
proposition is not persuasive.165 To the extent there is tension between what is 
persuasive and what is “correct,” it may not always be normatively appropriate for 
a constitutional decisionmaker to be guided by the latter. Validation from the 
constitutional community is a lot (if not all) of what matters to the legitimacy of 
constitutional law. That validation happens iteratively, as judicial actors seek both 
to “reflect and regulate constitutional culture,”166 but its indefinite absence is the 
death of a constitutional claim. 
 Which returns us to the question with which this Part began: how much 
should we be bothered that actors throughout the constitutional culture believe that 
substantive due process is an oxymoron if the belief lacks logical foundation? The 
answer to this question depends on who the actors are. Academics should of course 
interrogate the conventional wisdom of their subjects, and so constitutional law 
scholars and teachers should either adopt or explicitly reject a critique along the 
lines of Part I. Most legal advocates arguing either in favor of or against a 
substantive due process claim should assume whatever posture is most helpful to 
their overall legal position. The underlying analytic integrity of that position is not 
independently relevant, though certain repeat players such as the Solicitor General 
may moderate their advocacy in the immediate case for reputational or institutional 
reasons. Although the role morality of lawyers is not without complexity,167 it is 
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clear that legal advocates need not subjectively believe in the arguments they 
advance on clients’ behalf.168 
 The more difficult question is whether different obligations attach to judges 
or other constitutional decisionmakers. The possibility that memes distort the 
analytic integrity of constitutional law surfaces at least two potential problems for 
adjudicators, whom we will call judges for expository purposes. First, judges might 
be persuaded to make decisions that they would not make had they the time and 
inclination to interrogate the meme. Second, judges might themselves make use of 
memes to persuade their audiences to adopt the judges’ ultimate conclusions. 
 The first problem implicates the integrity of constitutional decisionmaking 
and the second the integrity of constitutional acceptance. Using a constitutional 
meme to persuade a judge as to a legal proposition is good lawyering. It is not clear 
why we should think about its effects differently than using any other rhetorical 
tools to persuade a judge as to the wisdom of one’s underlying case. The risk that a 
judge is duped by clever lawyers is one the American adversarial model is 
committed to tolerating.169 
 The second problem is less familiar. Could a Supreme Court Justice agree 
with every jot and tittle of Part I of this Essay and still take as given and write 
constitutional opinions under the assumption that substantive due process is a 
contradiction in terms?  
On one hand, judges act analogously all the time. Primus’s continuity 
tenders demonstrate that judicial decisionmakers often write things in opinions that 
they know not to be correct in a narrow sense. Charles Black memorably defended 
Justice Black’s insistence on First Amendment absolutism on the ground (never 
publicly espoused by the Justice)170 that this is the right “attitude” to take towards 
the Bill of Rights even as one fully appreciates the logical necessity of balancing.171 
Bickel, of course, was the most famous proponent of the Court’s disingenuous 
invocation of procedural barriers to substantive review—in the name of principle, 
no less!172 Constitutional adjudicators must respect other values in addition to and 
potentially in tension with the analytic integrity of particular propositions of 
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constitutional law. Common law constitutionalism indeed presupposes that 
constitutional truth is constructed out of materials whose value flows from features, 
such as antiquity or reliance,173 that are orthogonal to their “correctness.” One of 
those features is and should be the power to persuade. 
 On the other hand, that concession seems to condone judicial dishonesty. 
Normally lying is a moral bad,174 and it would be surprising if judges were held to 
lower standards than others in this domain. Indeed, in his blunt assessment of 
lawyering work as essentially involving lying and cheating, Daniel Markovits holds 
out the judicial function as commendably distinct.175 David Shapiro has urged that 
judicial candor is inherent in the obligation, crucial to the legitimacy of judging, to 
give reasons: “In a sense, candor is the sine qua non of all other restraints on abuse 
of judicial power, for the limitations imposed by constitutions, statutes, and 
precedents count for little if judges feel free to believe one thing about them and to 
say another.”176 Micah Schwartzman writes that an adjudicator who brings the 
violence of the state to bear upon a real-world dispute owes a moral duty to the 
litigants to give an honest assessments of his or her reasons for action.177  
 Scholars who defend judicial dishonesty sometimes argue that the rule of 
law requires decisions reached on policy or intuitive grounds nonetheless to be 
articulated through legal technicalities.178 The apparent reliance on technicalities 
gives a judicial opinion the appearance of law and can conceal political motivations. 
But at other times such references can have a nearly opposite effect, suggesting a 
lack of judicial empathy or an inability to appreciate the stakes of a decision. The 
occasional imperative for the Supreme Court especially to communicate in non-
technical language might be one of the legacies of Brown v. Board of Education.179 
Brown’s outsized significance surely results in part from an appeal to constitutional 
common sense, validated over time, as a strategy for defeating legalistic but myopic 
arguments based on text, history, and precedent.180 
                                                 
173 See LON FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 13 (1940). 
174 See generally SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978). 
175 MARKOVITS, supra note 168, at 3–4, 14–15.  
176 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987). 
177 See Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 990 (2008). 
178 See Martin Shapiro, Judges as Liars, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 155 (1994); GUIDO CALABRESI 
& PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
179 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
180 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 421 
(1960) (“Simplicity is out of fashion, and the basic scheme of reasoning on which these cases can 
be justified is awkwardly simple.”); see generally JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE 
CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT’S OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTION AS 
SOMETHING WE THE PEOPLE CAN UNDERSTAND (1992). 
32 
 
 Any tension between the technical accuracy of a constitutional opinion and 
its public intelligibility undermines the case that judicial candor advances public 
understanding. The degree of identity between judicial and public understanding is 
an empirical question, and it seems obvious that perfect identity is not the answer. 
That fact, if true, is not quite fatal for someone like Schwartzman, who adopts a 
deontological stance towards the obligation of judicial sincerity.181 Note, though, 
that constitutional law at the Supreme Court level is self-consciously not 
deontological in respect to the litigants. The Court’s standards for certiorari 
disclaim any interest in “error-correction,” instead searching for cases that may be 
used as “vehicles” to announce broader rules, standards, and principles for the 
benefit of society more generally.182 The Court, in other words, understands its job 
to treat litigants as means rather than as ends in themselves.183 
 I want to suggest that judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases should best be 
understood as emerging from an act of translation. Producing a judicial opinion 
involves multiple decision nodes. A judge reaches a legal conclusion through some 
mental process, the particulars of which are (it is important to say) irrelevant for 
our purposes. Communicating that decision to an audience of colleagues, litigants, 
lawyers, and the public involves a new set of choices. If the decision was reached 
by intuition (and in the unlikely event the judge is aware that it was),184 the judge 
must decide whether to reveal that fact or instead to write an opinion that uses the 
tools of law to validate the hunch. If the judge reached the decision through the 
very application of such tools (that is, if the judge perceives herself to have done 
so), the judge still must decide whether and how to use those tools in writing the 
opinion. Persuasion makes powerful demands at this stage, and a conscientious 
judge should be aware that what persuades him or her might not persuade others. 
The judge must communicate his or her ideas in a distinctive register—the 
language, if you will, of constitutional rhetoric. 
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 Interpretive discourse has seen translation metaphors before, and it is 
important to distinguish other uses.185 Lawrence Lessig has argued that fidelity to 
the Constitution requires a form of translation, a sensitivity both to an unchanging 
text and a changing context that can legitimate interpretive outcomes that differ 
from what originalism might superficially seem to require.186 Lessig’s insight is to 
more fully appreciate time as a dimension of difference in textual meaning. Lessig’s 
claim is consistent with the notion that constitutional language such as “due process 
of law” lacks the stability to make much sense of treating substantive due process 
as an inherent contradiction in terms. But like most constitutional theorists who 
have referenced translation, Lessig is concerned with the meanings a decisionmaker 
attaches to a text he or she is charged with interpreting. My concern, instead, is with 
the way in which the decisionmaker communicates that interpretive decision to his 
or her audience. 
 James Boyd White’s usage is closer to mine, though his project has a 
different normative center. For White, the metaphor of translation captures the idea 
that someone who writes a legal opinion performs a creative act that does not 
(because it cannot) simply reproduce the original text but rather is faithful both to 
it and to the reader of the translation; it is “a way of establishing relations by 
reciprocal gesture.”187 A translation “will be judged by its coherence, by the kinds 
of fidelity it establishes with the original, and by the ethical and cultural meaning 
it performs as a gesture of its own.”188 Like a good translation, the lawgiver should 
be humble about his or her capacity for complete exposition and should understand 
the ways in which the reader’s understandings bind the law’s public expression (and 
therefore the law itself).189 
 A constitutional meme is a conventional form of public expression of 
constitutional law. It is not a legal fiction because its falsity is not generally 
acknowledged or even realized, either by author or by reader.190 But the metaphor 
of translation helps us to understand why a constitutional meme is not, then, a lie—
even if its falsity is known by the author alone.191 As an undergraduate I took a 
course whose professor was a native French speaker. This professor had a habit of 
referring to a prospective meeting with a student as a rendezvous. Among French 
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speakers, this usage is entirely unremarkable, as the word is best translated into 
English as “meeting.”192 Among American students, it was embarrassingly off-key, 
since in American culture the word commonly connotes a meeting for the specific 
purpose of a liaison. When this alternative meaning was (gingerly) brought to the 
professor’s attention, he began to say “meeting,” even though rendezvous came 
more naturally to his mind. We would never say the professor was lying or even 
that he was being less than candid, even though he was not speaking his mind and 
even though the word he initially used “technically” meant exactly what he 
intended to convey. We would say instead that he was translating.  
Now consider a judge who disagrees with the Court’s decision in 
Obergefell. It does not matter for our purposes what grounds this disagreement, 
whether a view that there is not sufficient consensus for the Court to mandate 
marriage equality through the Constitution,193 that the generation that ratified the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand it to extend to regulation of marriage in 
this way,194 that extending marriage to same-sex couples threatens religious 
liberty,195 or that same-sex relationships are immoral or may validly be treated as 
such by the state.196 Should this hypothetical dissenting judge’s further argument 
that substantive due process “distorts the constitutional text”197 depend on whether 
he or she agrees that it is a textual contradiction? I think not, just as advancing the 
argument that the Obergefell Court has repeated the errors of Dred Scott198 should 
not depend on whether the judge believes Dred Scott was erroneous. If it has 
become a conventional view of the law-consuming public (including members of 
the legal profession and other professional elites who form the core of the judge’s 
audience) that substantive due process is a textual distortion and that Dred Scott 
was wrong, then those propositions are part of our constitutional law and are 
therefore resources for use in constitutional argument. The judge who avails herself 
of those resources in the course of adjudicative exposition engages in an act of 
translation. 
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Hold the rotten eggs and tomatoes until an important objection is addressed. 
My French-speaking professor began to use “meeting” rather than rendezvous 
because he was trying earnestly to articulate his intended meaning to his students. 
He was not trying to communicate something that he did not believe, and he was 
not trying to persuade his students of anything. The usage of constitutional memes 
that I am offering shares the first feature by hypothesis. In the Obergefell 
hypothetical, the judge is trying to communicate a proposition of constitutional law 
that the judge sincerely believes: the Constitution does not require state recognition 
of same-sex marriage. The language in which he is doing so has no abstract 
meaning (as rendezvous has no abstract meaning); it has an acquired constitutional 
meaning that it is rhetorically useful for the judge to invoke. In so doing the judge 
is engaging the reader as a participant in exposition, as any good translator does.199 
And as constitutional law requires. The line of division between 
communication and persuasion is one the epistemology of constitutional law does 
not recognize. It is widely agreed among constitutional scholars that propositions 
of constitutional law acquire their permanence through public acceptance.200  As 
Richard Fallon writes, “the legal legitimacy of the Constitution depends much more 
on its present sociological acceptance (and thus its sociological legitimacy) than 
upon the (questionable) legality of its formal ratification. Other fundamental 
elements of the constitutional order, including practices of constitutional 
interpretation, also owe their legal legitimacy to current sociological 
acceptance.”201 If this is true, then successful rhetoric is a legal obligation of a 
constitutional judge.202 
Conclusion 
 Constitutional memes are entrenched—indeed, are self-reinforcing—but 
they are not permanent. It was once hornbook law that rights could be divided into 
distinct civil, political, or social rights.203 We no longer think of rights in those 
terms, and the categories were overlapping and internally inconsistent even during 
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Reconstruction, the heyday of the tripartite scheme.204 This change in legal 
understanding did not occur because of an intervening constitutional amendment, 
Supreme Court decision, or other change in substantive constitutional law. What 
changed was the conventional public expression of rights, as the language of rights 
increasingly came to represent an aspiration towards universal moral equality. 
Substantive due process might not always be though incompatible with the 
constitutional text, and indeed this Essay can be understood, in part, as a step 
towards that end. 
 That said, the Essay is itself a paradox. It seeks to expose fallacies in the 
textual argument against substantive due process but it is neither a defense of 
substantive due process as a constitutional doctrine nor even a criticism of the 
textual argument. The way to square this circle is to understand the Essay as a kind 
of defense of fallacies. Constructing and relying upon constitutional memes that 
serve one’s rhetorical purposes is part of what it means to advance arguments in the 
real world that constitutional law regulates. Scholars can and should deconstruct 
old ideas, but judges may be forgiven if they haven’t the time. 
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